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**FORMATION PECULIARITIES
OF THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL RADICALISM (2012 – 2024)**

Abstract. *The purpose of the research* is to identify the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism through the prism of its affiliation and formation under the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2012 – 2024). *The methodology of the research* is based on an integrated approach, as well as the

use of a special computer method of complex analysis (CNA), as well as special historical methods (historical typological and historical systemic), with the help of which the authors managed to elucidate the peculiarities of the Russian political radicalism formation during the specified period. **The scientific novelty** consists in the identification of the ideological component of the Russian political radicalism through the use of an innovative computer methodology. **The Conclusions.** The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that has been shaped by historical, social, economic and political factors. During the period of 2012 – 2024, V. Putin's ideological discourse has been undergoing a "conservative turn", defined as "Russia's special path". The results of the study have shown that this ideology during this period is not an exclusively internal phenomenon of this country. The Russian right-wing radicalism has been formed not simply by borrowing ideas from the West, but on the basis of the existing connection between Russia and Western countries. The connection could be traced not only by means of organisations that had influence but also due to the influence of thinkers, theorists, ideologues, and adherents of various movements of the extreme right-wing radicalism and religious political radicalism. The most influential have been a group of extreme right-wing thinkers among them. It should be noted that Aleksandr Dugin and Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev have been among the active promoters of Western ideas of the right-wing radicalism in Russia. Therefore, the myth should be debunked regarding the statement of the Russian government and the Russian elite that the Russian right-wing radicalism has been exclusively Russian. In this case, it is more decent to appeal to the claim made by Putin and some Western representatives of the far right that Russia is the West – but the West that they believe has been lost due to the overwhelming influence of the liberal and leftist values. Putin's ideology (2012 – 2024) has been a distorted, Russified model of political radicalism based on a combination of authoritarianism, patriotism, anti-Western sentiment, conservatism, state capitalism and military force. This ideology has allowed V. Putin and his entourage to ensure control over the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy, posing a serious threat to the integrity of the international relations system. A striking example is the Russo-Ukrainian War, which broke out in 2014 and continues to this day. This war has posed a serious threat to the collapse of the European project and the emergence of the Kremlin's Eurasian anti-liberal project in its place.

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Key words: Russian political radicalism, Putin's ideology, Russia, the West, America.

ОСОБЛИВОСТІ СТАНОВЛЕННЯ РОСІЙСЬКОГО ПОЛІТИЧНОГО РАДИКАЛІЗМУ (2012 – 2024)

Анотація. **Мета дослідження** – визначити особливості російського політичного радикалізму через призму його приналежності та формування за президентства Владіміра Путіна (2012 – 2024). **Методологія дослідження** ґрунтується на комплексному підході, в основі якого лежить використання спеціального комп'ютерного методу комплексного аналізу (CNA), а також спеціально-історичних методів (історико-типологічний та історико-системний), за допомогою яких авторам вдалося з'ясувати особливості формування російського політичного радикалізму упродовж вказаного періоду. **Наукова новизна** полягає у визначенні ідеологічної складової російського політичного радикалізму шляхом застосування новаторської комп'ютерної методики. **Висновки.** Російський політичний радикалізм є багатопларовим явищем, яке сформувалося під впливом історичних, соціальних, економічних та політичних факторів. Упродовж 2012 – 2024 рр. в ідеологічному дискурсі В. Путіна відбувається "консервативний поворот", який визначається як "особливий шлях Росії". Результати проведеного дослідження свідчать, що ця ідеологія упродовж вказаного періоду не є винятково внутрішнім явищем цієї країни. Російський правий радикалізм формувалася не просто із запозиченням ідей Заходу, а на основі усталеного зв'язку між Росією та країнами Заходу. Цей зв'язок простежується через вплив не скільки організацій, скільки мислителів, теоретиків, ідеологів, адентів різних течій вкрай правого радикалізму та релігійного політичного радикалізму, з-поміж яких найбільш впливовими виявилися група вкрай правих мислителів. Варто зауважити, що серед активних популяризаторів західних ідей правого радикалізму в Росії є Александр Дугін та російський

мільярдер Костянтин Малофеев. Російський правий радикалізм не є винятково російським, як про це заявляють представники російського уряду та, російської еліти. Правильнішим у цьому випадку є твердження самого В. Путіна та деяких західних представників вкрай правих, що Росія це і є Захід, але такий Захід, який був, на їхню думку, втрачений через надто сильний вплив ліберальних і лівих цінностей.

Ідеологія Путіна (2012 – 2024) – це спотворена, доопрацьована “по-російськи” модель політичного радикалізму, яка базується на поєднанні авторитаризму, патріотизму, антизахідних настроїв, консерватизму, державного капіталізму та військової сили. Ця ідеологія дає змогу В. Путіну та його оточенню забезпечити контроль над країною та проводити агресивну зовнішню політику, становлячи серйозну небезпеку цілісності системи міжнародних відносин. Яскравим прикладом є російсько-українська війна, яка почалася у 2014 р. і триває донині. Ця війна є серйозною загрозою розвалу європейського проєкту і приходу на його місце Євразійського антиліберального проєкту Кремля.

Фінансування. Робота виконана за підтримки Національного наукового центру (Польща) в рамках дослідницького проєкту “Історичні нарративи в Web 2.0 як функціональний елемент національних ідентичностей у Центральній та Східній Європі”, № УМО-2020/39/В/HS3/01237.

Ключові слова: російський політичний радикалізм, путінська ідеологія, Росія, Захід, Америка.

The Problem Statement. The political radicalism has always been an ideological component of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and nowadays the Russian Federation, and it has been clearly visible since Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia at the early 21st century. The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that was formed under the influence of historical, social, economic and political factors. It not only affects Russia’s domestic politics, but also has a significant impact on the international security and stability. In turn, Putin’s ideology, well known as the “Russkiy mir” (Russian World) doctrine, is authoritarian, nationalistic, anti-Western, and military. Russia’s ruling circles emphasise the autonomy of the Russian political tradition constantly, although the reality is the opposite. Russia usually does not generate new ideas – it borrows them from others and then brings them to ad absurdum (Hovorun, 2023).

Therefore, **the purpose of the research** is to elucidate the structure and connections of the Russian political radicalism through the prism of its belonging and formation as an exclusively Russian phenomenon or ideology based on Western ideologemes.

The Review of Recent Research and Publications. Putin’s aggressive policy is increasingly attracting the attention of the international community. The scholars were not left out. There were different studies published on the interpretation and understanding of the Russian ideological component (Charles Clover (Clover, 2022), Nicola Guerra (Guerra, 2024), Ralf Havertz (Havertz, 2021), Robert Horvath (Horvath, 2021), Mikhail Suslov (Suslov, 2024) and the others) during the last 10 years. There were debates regarding the definition of the Russian political system, opinions differed on the “hybrid regime”, authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

According to the Ukrainian scholar S. Hromenko, the political crisis in Russia in 2011 – 2012 ended the “hybrid regime” and facilitated the introduction of the “true” authoritarianism. Russia’s occupation of the Crimea in 2014 paved the way for totalitarianism. The manifestations on the political radicalism in Russia began to be actively observed in 2013. Thus, in his address to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared himself a conservative and signed a law against “propaganda of homosexuality” in Russia, hence, launching state homophobia. The Kremlin introduced the first laws against the “rehabilitation of the Nazism” in 2014. Russia rapidly turned into an authoritarian states

with some totalitarian elements (militarisation of kindergartens, a single history textbook at school, and “the foundations of the Russian statehood” in universities) at the beginning of 2022 (Hromenko, 2024).

Nowadays Putin’s rhetoric is entirely anti-Western. The so-called ideology of the “Russkiy mir” (Russian World) is an ideological undercurrent of xenophobia based on both the Old Russian nationalism and Western fascism. That is, it is not a coherent system of views formed exclusively by the Russian political elite. It is the liberals, who are the greatest global evil for Putinists, just as the communists were for the fascists and the communists and the Jews were for the Nazis (Hovorun, 2023).

However, there are also those, who reject the very possibility of ideology in modern Russia. S. Guriev, Head of the London Business School is among them, who emphasised that: “today there is no ideology in the Russian Constitution. In 2020, they added God and marriage as a union between a man and a woman, but it still says that there is no ideology in Russia. Putin has no internally agreed ideological principles and beliefs. You can find any set of words in Putin’s speeches – left, right, liberal, conservative, obscurantist, modern, pro-Western, anti-Western. These are just different versions of the propaganda he needs to stay in power” (Hromenko, 2024). However, the fact that contemporary the Russian ideology does not resemble the universally recognised ideologies of communism and conservatism does not mean that it does not exist at all. It exists, but it is a transformed ideology based on a military approach.

Despite the existing amount of scientific work on the topic we offered and the methodology of its research, there are practically no studies available today. A similar research methodology was applied in scientific articles written by: V. Ilnytskyi, V. Starka and M. Haliv (Ilnytskyi, Starka & Haliv, 2022), V. Telvak and W. Werner (Telvak & Werner, 2023), W. Werner and L. Vovchuk (Werner & Vovchuk, 2023; Vovchuk & Werner, 2024).

The Results of the Research. The question is whether the Russian political radicalism is really exclusively Russian, as the Russians themselves emphasise, or whether it is a myth. Or was this ideology formed on the basis of the introduction of certain Western ideologemes with the addition of Russia’s own vision? The authors conducted a thorough research using CAN in order to answer these questions.

As the classics once noted: “Russia cannot be understood with the mind” (Tyutchev, 2003, p. 165). His thesis has become a challenge for the scientific world, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, when Putin, a personality, who will try to “take apart and put together a single puzzle”, came to power in Russia for a long time. There are different approaches to explaining and understanding the behaviour and actions of Russia and its leader in 2012 – 2024 prompted the authors of this paper to try to provide their own vision of this aspect through a study of the scientific literature on this topic.

First of all, we selected foreign and Russian studies (monographs, scientific articles, Internet sources) on the coverage of the Russian ideology or related to this topic. The total number of references was 145. The next step in the research was the formation of a database based on the selected scientific works. The main criteria for this database were: 1) the influence group, which includes the most influential Russian and foreign theorists, adherents, and ideologues as disseminators of ideology (Table 1); 2) the Russian and foreign organisations as a source of influence (organisations, media, publishing houses) (Table 2); 3) the country of influence (source_Country) and the country being influenced (Country).

Table 1

Table of the most present in analysed sources Russian and foreign theoreticians, adepts, ideologists as spreaders of ideology

№	Country	Group of influence
1	Belgium	Jean-François Thiriart
2	France	Alain de Benoist Christian Bouchet
3	Italy	Claudio Mutti
4	Russia	Aleksandr Dugin Konstantin Malofeev Vladimir Putin
5	Spain	Ignacio Arsuaga
6	the USA	Allan C. Carlson

Table 2

Table of the most present in analysed sources Russian and foreign organizations as a source of influence

№	Country	Organizations as a source of influence
1	France	GRECE National Front/National Rally
2	German	AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) German Imperial Party
3	Italy	Italian Social Movement New Order World Congress of Families XIII Verona
4	Russia	Elements FamilyPolicy.ru Hyperborea (Russia) International Russian Conservative Forum (2015) National Bolshevik Party, Patriarchal Commission on protection of motherhood and childhood Russkii Obraz
5	Spain	CitizenGO Hyperborea
6	the United Kingdom	Arktos Media British National Party
7	the USA	National Vanguard World Congress of Families (WCF)

It is important that the agents of influence are the representatives of the second half of the 20th century and the 21st century. The same issue concerns organisations. Some of them no longer exist, but are mentioned in the researches we have studied as having influenced the formation of a global far right movement including the Russian ideology. These Tables (Figs. 1, 2) were created using the Degree centrality parameter (Werner & Vovchuk, 2023, p. 250).

The next step was to find out to what extent the Russian ideology is exclusively Russian, as the Russians claim. The scholars decided to do this by identifying the existing connection in terms of ideology between Russia and Western countries. Using the CNA approach to data analysis, a graph was constructed based on a comparison of the connections between states and

organisations (Table 3). According to this graph, Russia has ideological ties with Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States, with the two former having the strongest ties.

Analysing this graph with the help of the Betweenness centrality parameter (Fig. 1), the highest result is observed for the vertices ‘source_Russia’ and ‘Russia’, ‘National Bolshevik Party’, ‘Russkii Obraz’, which indicates that the Russian organisations had the greatest influence on the formation of the Russian discourse of political radicalism.




Fig. 1. Graph 1 on relations between States and organizations (State – Organization – State)

Table 3

Table of the most central vertices (parameter of betweenness: localisation of vertex in shortest way between other vertices)

№	Node	betweenness
1	source_Russia	0.295333
2	World Congress of Families (WCF)	0.236630
3	National Party of Europe	0.230482
4	Russia	0.226904
5	Italy	0.226758
6	European Liberation Front	0.213273
7	National Bolshevik Party	0.203685
8	World Congress of Families XIII Verona	0.190872
9	Young Europe	0.189867
10	Russkii Obraz	0.126844
11	Patriarchal Commission on protection of motherhood and childhood	0.113778
12	CEDADE	0.109472
13	United Kingdom	0.102722
14	Italian Social Movement	0.098406
15	German Imperial Party	0.096203
16	France	0.079284
17	Golden Dawn	0.073674
18	British National Party	0.073259
19	source_Germany	0.073101
20	Hyperborea (Spain)	0.061686
21	Hyperborea (Russia)	0.060949
22	source_Italy	0.059107
23	New Order	0.058941
24	FamilyPolicy.ru	0.054636
25	National Vanguard	0.051590
26	International Russian Conservative Forum (2015)	0.049367
27	AfD (Alternative für Deutschland)	0.049367
28	GRECE	0.049041
29	Third Position	0.040406
30	source_Spain	0.039326

However, we can see the links between Russian organisations and Western ones in the following clusters. In the cluster with the Russian far right organisation Russkii Obraz at the top (created by Ilya Goryachev (Horvath, 2021, p. 40)), we can see its connection with the Serbian far right organisation the organisation Obraz, which was the ideological inspiration for the founders of the Russkii Obraz. The second Western organisation that had an ideological influence was the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

An interesting feature of the Russkii Obraz cluster is that it is separate from the main “Russia” cluster. It suggests that despite the existing ties between this organisation and organisations in “Russia” cluster, they are not as strong as the ties with the Russian nationalist organisations that existed in the 2000s. It can be safely said that the Russian nationalist organisations in the 2000s formed a world of their own, a special world. This structure of

communication is a prerequisite that confirms the thesis of Robert Horvath, the author of the book on the history of the *Russkij Obraz*, that the peculiarity of the Russian nationalism was that it was subjected to a policy of “management” (menaged nationalism) by the Kremlin (Horvath, 2021, p. 40).

Another cluster in which the Russian organisations have links with Western organisations was the ‘USA’ cluster, in which the main organisation is the World Congress of Families (WCF). The WCF was an American Christian right-wing organisation that was formed by Allan C. Carlson, an American scholar and Reagan appointee to the National Commission on Children, as a result of his meeting with the Russian sociologist Anatolij Antonov and others intellectuals in Moscow in 1995. The WCF’s activities were focused on supporting the anti-LGBT movement (limiting the rights of LGBT people under the pretext of protecting the “natural family” – defined as heterosexual married couples with their biological children) (Wepukhulu, 2023) and organising conferences. There were the following participants in WCF conferences: the representatives of both the Christian Right and other extreme right-wing movements. The WCF’s cooperation with the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian far right, especially with billionaire Konstantin Malofeev, is particularly important (Tip of the Iceberg, 2021).

The WCF is linked in this cluster to the Spanish Christian right organisation CitizenGO and to the Russian organisation FamilyPolitycy.ru, created by Alexey Komov, who was a member of the WCF in the 2010s. It is interesting that the American media outlet ‘InfoWars’, owned by Alex Jones, one of the main media activists of the Alt-Right, is linked to the Russian media outlet ‘Tsargrad’, owned by Konstantin Malofeev, a Russian billionaire and one of the main proponents of promoting the ideas of traditional values and decommunisation.

Malofeev supports the Russian Orthodox Church and Putin’s ideas actively. He was among the supporters of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and the war with Ukraine. He financed Strelkov’s (Girkin’s) unit at the very beginning of the war. Strelkov himself used to work as a security guard for Malofeev’s company (Marshall Malofeev..., 2014). Malofeev’s influence can be traced through the activities of his various organisations such as: Tsargrad TV channel (Malofeev letom zapuskaet, 2015), Katehon portal (Shekhovtsov, 2023, p. 175), NGOs Safe Internet League and St. Basil the Great Foundation on the Russian territory.

K. Malofeev sponsored the nationalist student movement “Brotherhood of Academics”. This organisation has branches in various Russian universities and holds militant imperialist views”. Shortly before the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, “the Brotherhood” grew from a local community at the Tsargorod Society to a structure with branches in at least 20 cities in Russia and on the territories of Ukraine, including Kherson region and the Crimea.

This organisation held lectures on the Russian nationalism for its members, meetings with the regional politicians far right and conservative speakers. There were among them, for example, the daughter of the far right philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, who Daria and Pyotr Tolstoy, a member of Putin’s United Russia party. The members of the brotherhood see Russia’s “mission” as defeating “global evil” and “standing guard over the Christian Faith and traditional values”. At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church should “acquire universal status and become the first in world Orthodoxy”. In their view, the existence of Ukraine is a constant threat to the Russian civilisation (Rosiiskyi oliharkh, 2024).

The third top in parameter of betweenness is the National Party of Europe, a British organisation founded in 1962 by the British prewar-fascist leader Oswald Moseley, which

aimed at uniting supporters of pan-European nationalism. The members of this organisation were: Union Movement (UK), German Imperial Party, Italian Social Movement and Young Europe (Belgium) (Goddrick-Clarke, 2002, p. 30).

The idea of pan-European nationalism also unites the Belgian-Spanish cluster, which is based on the Belgian organisation Young Europe, which was created by Jean-François Thiriart, a representative of Belgian political radicalism. He was a theorist of pan-European nationalism which objective was to create a single pan-European state. He considered the idea of creating a Euro-Soviet Empire (Shekhovtsov, 2018, pp. 30–31). In 1992, a few months before his death, he travelled to Russia, where he met with A. Dugin.

The National Bolshevik Party, a political party founded by A. Dugin and Eduard Limonov in 1993, also holds a dominant position in the graph (Laruelle, 2015, p. 12). Although the name of the party and its ideology contain the word bolshevism, the formation of this organisation was the result of reception not of Lenin's ideas, but of the western extreme right-wing current of the National Bolshevism, which was formed at the beginning of the 1920s in Germany (Shekhovtsov, 2018, p. 4). A. Dugin became familiar with the ideas of the National Bolshevism during his travels in Western Europe. In 1994, the National Bolshevik Party joined the European Liberation Front, which was established in 1991 (Laruelle, 2015, p. 46).

The Patriarchal Commission on the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, an organisation of the Russian Orthodox Church established in 2011, whose members included Patriarch Kiril, K. Malofeev (Obrazovan Patriarshiy sovet, 2011) and sociologist Anatoliy Antonov (Spisok ekspertov Patriarshey komissii, 2022), also plays a significant role. The commission cooperated with FamilyPolicy.ru, an organisation of A. Komov, and with the Western Christian right, especially the WCF (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, pp. 1–2, 109).

Based on the results of Graph 1, we can talk about Russia's existing ties with Western countries, dominated by Italy and France, and the influence of Western organisations on the Russian ones in terms of ideology through both cooperation and borrowing ideas. However, these ties are rather dispersed.

We constructed Graph 2 based on the Louvain Community Detection Algorithm (Fig. 2) in order to verify the validity of these results, which surprised us. According to this Graph, Russia has closer ties with the United States, Ireland, Bulgaria and Serbia, while its ties with the previously identified countries do not have such kind of influence. The dominant position in this case is occupied by the United States, which has become a 'donor' of the nationalist ideas, anti-globalisation and religious fundamentalism to Russia.

It is well known that philosophers, thinkers, and theorists play an important role in the formation of any political ideology, as they are the originators of the basic ideas and concepts of the ideology. It is them, who create the philosophical basis that explains and justifies specific political views and goals.

Therefore, we tried to find out which connection and influence is stronger in the formation of the Russian political radicalism: the country, the organisation, or theorists, adherents, and ideologues. We constructed graphs 3 and 4 (Fig. 2, 3) in order to do it, which were based on these three categories. The results showed that Russia has closer ties not with countries or organisations, but rather with the help of the individuals. The dominant positions in this case are occupied by the Italian, the French, and the Belgian theorists and ideologues.

The betweenness parameter in Graph 4 (Table 4) again confirms the significance of the vertices in the person category. There are occupied 10 positions out of the 30 top positions

Russia's particular anti-Western path, nevertheless, he is a successor of many Western currents concerning the political radicalism and an active participant in the Western discourse of far-right political radicalism, rather than the creator of a "special path" of the Russian far-right thought.

In the 1990s, A. Dugin established the Russian journals: "Milyi Angel" and "Elements" (Shekhovtsov, 2015, pp. 39–40), which published the Russian translations of articles by the Western representatives of far right radicalism. Chief focus was on the works by the representatives of the French New Right and Italian Traditionalism (Laruelle, 2019, p. 156, 159).

As it is shown in Graph 4, Dugin's influence can be traced primarily within the discourse of the Russian and Western extreme right-wing thought. Some Western journalists claimed that A. Dugin is not Putin's "brain". Today, there are no reliable sources indicating Dugin's influence on Putin or Putin's support for Dugin. Dugin supports Vladimir Putin, especially his actions regarding Russia's war against Ukraine (Dugin, 2024a).

Dugin was particularly linked to the Russian billionaire Konstantin Malofeev as he was involved in projects such as Tsargrad TV in the Russian far-right discourse during the 2010s and 2020s. This connection further highlights that while Malofeev is a particular Russian Christian right-winger, who worked closely with the Western Christian right in the 2010s, he is far more radical than many on the Western Christian right.

The second position in terms of influence is occupied by the ideas of Roberto Fiore, a representative of the Italian fascism. His concept was influenced by the ideas of Julius Evola – the Italian Philosopher of fascism and Traditionalism. At the end of 1980s, he collaborated with the British fascist party National Front (Godrick-Clarke, 2002, p. 68). In the 1990s Fiore created the New Force Party (Guerra, 2024, p. 141). The third place goes to Vladimir Yakunin, the Russian billionaire and former Head of Russian Railways. A strong supporter of traditional values, Yakunin financed the events connected with the WCF like the conference: the "Large Families – the Future of Humanity" International Forum in 2014.

Fourth to sixth places were given to the Western representatives of far right political radicalism Jean-François Thiriart, Alain de Benoist, Claudio Mutti.

The influence of A. Komov, the Russian supporter of traditional values, who was Malofeev's collaborator and a member of the WCF and CitizenGO is also noticeable (Tip of the Iceberg, 2021). He also worked with the Italian Lega Nord Party (Congresso Federale Lega Nord, 2013). His views were influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov (who ranks 8th in column 4 in terms of influence) (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, p. 108). Smirnov was one of the creators of the International Forum 'Large Family and the Future of Humanity' which took place in Moscow in 2014 (On September, 2014).

Thus, Graphs 3 and 4 confirm that individuals, rather than organisations, had a greater influence on the formation of the Russian political radicalism. This influence can be traced back to the Russian theorists, ideologues, and adherents who derived their ideas from the Italian, the French, the Spanish, the German, the British, and the American philosophers, theorists, and thinkers. It should be noted that such Russian representatives as A. Dugin, K. Malofeev, V. Yakunin, A. Komov, and D. Smirnov were among the organisers of the above-mentioned organisations, as well as among the members of radical foreign organisations.

Table 4

Table of the most central vertices in Graph 3

№	Node	betweenness
1	Russia	0.232135
2	Aleksandr Dugin	0.183792
3	source_Russia	0.169282
4	Italy	0.123960
5	World Congress of Families (WCF)	0.102982
6	Arktos Media	0.090745
7	World Congress of Families XIII Verona	0.090048
8	source_USA	0.089781
9	source_Italy	0.083468
10	United Kingdom	0.079578
11	International Russian Conservative Forum (2015 r.).	0.075286
12	USA	0.063147
13	Roberto Fiore	0.061589
14	Vladimir Yakunin	0.057090
15	World Congress of Families XI The Budapest Family Summit	0.052972
16	Jean-François Thiriart	0.050124
17	Milyi Angel	0.049299
18	Orion	0.045092
19	source_Germany	0.044690
20	Russkii Obraz	0.043425
21	Alain de Benoist	0.043354
22	GRECE	0.042719
23	Claudio Mutti	0.041657
24	Alexey Komov	0.039940
25	CitizenGO	0.035368
26	Archpriest Dmitry Smirnov	0.033929
27	Brian S. Brown	0.033891
28	Elements (Russia)	0.032977
29	Germany	0.032377
30	Society of the Thule Group (Spain)	0.031896

Discussion. Putin’s ideological discourse was not always the part of the Russian far-right political radicalism discourse. At the beginning of his first presidential term in 2000, in an interview in the first person, the Russian President emphasised Russia’s belonging to the Western European culture and the country’s democratic development. “Wherever our people live – in the Far East or the South – we are Europeans” (Gevorkyan, Kolesnikov & Timakova, 2000, pp. 155–156). However, this trend did not last long. Under the influence of the anti-Westernism ideas (traced in Putin’s Munich speech in 2007 (Vyistuplenie i diskussiya, 2007) and Putin’s organisation of the funeral of the white general Anton Denikin and the Russian Philosopher of fascism Ivan Ilyin in Moscow in 2005 (Verina, 2013)), the declared direction is gradually being veered off course.

At the beginning of of V. Putin’s second presidential term (in 2012), his ideology saw a so-called “conservative turn” based on new ideas of traditional values (Stoeckl & Uzlaner,

2022, pp. 76–77, 87–88). Putin emphasised a return to the Russian traditional values that had been formed over centuries. However, the very idea of the “traditional values” is of the Western origin. This idea was created among the American Christian Right in the second half of the 20th century (Solodovnikova, 2021). The American cultural wars started to become more globalised in the late 1980s, and it was within this framework that they started to influence the Russian Orthodox Church discourse in the 1990s.

During the 1990s, American figures of the Christian Right began to visit Russia, bringing with them the ideas of the anti-abortion movement and the traditional family (Stoeckl & Uzlaner, 2022, p. 126). Among them was the American demographer Allan C. Carlson, a follower of the Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, who immigrated to the United States after the October Revolution and established a Sociology Department at Harvard. In 1995, Allan Carlson met with the Russian demographer Anatoliy Antonov in Moscow. The result of this meeting was Carlson’s decision to create an organisation in the United States to defend the traditional family – the World Congress of Families (Solodovnikova, 2021).

On December 12, 2012, in his Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin named a number of ideas that would become important components of his ideology of political radicalism: spiritual bonds, traditional values, the cult of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the idea of Russia’s special civilisational path (Putin nazval Rossiyu, 2020).

And in 2013, on Putin’s initiative, a law on “foreign agents” was passed, which provided for punishment for insulting the religious feelings of believers and the so-called law banning LGBT propaganda. This period was a turning point in Putin’s ideology. Putin’s idea of Russian world began to be realised due to the annexation of the Crimea and the occupation of eastern Ukraine. Putin was aware of the Western support for Ukraine as an attempt to turn Ukraine into an “anti-Russia” (Statya Vladimira Putina, 2021). This idea was one of the manifestations of the growing radicalisation of the anti-Westernism in Russia.

The conservative turn in Putin’s ideology was supported by the representatives of the Western far-right radicalism. For example, there are the representatives of the American Alt-Right among them: Richard B. Spencer (Feuer & Higgins, 2016), Matthew Heimbach, Sam Dickson and Jared Taylor (Hankes, 2015), the member of the French New Right Guillaume Faye (François & Nonjon, 2022) and the Italian fascist activist Roberto Fiore (Chizhova & Shimov, 2015).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, 2022 intensified the radicalisation of the idea of Russia’s special path. The Russian authorities declared that the war with Ukraine was allegedly a war between the Russian world and the West over the defence of traditional values (Patrushev, 2024). Later on, there was a reception of the ideas of the Western far-right radicalism, which appeared in the speeches of the representatives of various trends on the Russian radicalism – according to Putin’s speech, there appeared the idea of political correctness (Plenarnoe zasedanie, 2023), and according to Dugin’s speech during an interview with Tucker Carlson, the idea of “woke” (Dugin, 2024b). This once again emphasises that Russia is not on a special path. The Russian ideological discourse (2012 – 2024) is part of the Western far-right discourse.

The Conclusion. The Russian political radicalism is a multi-layered phenomenon that has been shaped by historical, social, economic and political factors. In the period of 2012 – 2024, V. Putin’s ideological discourse was undergoing a “conservative turn”, defined as “Russia’s special path”. The results of the study have shown that this ideology during this period is not an exclusively internal phenomenon of this country. The Russian right-wing

radicalism has been formed not simply by borrowing ideas from the West, but on the basis of the existing connection between Russia and Western countries. The connection could be traced not only by means of organisations that had influence but also due to the influence of thinkers, theorists, ideologues, and adherents of various movements of the extreme right-wing radicalism and religious political radicalism. The most influential have been a group of extreme right-wing thinkers among them. It should be noted that A. Dugin and the Russian billionaire K. Malofeev have been among the active promoters of Western ideas of the right-wing radicalism in Russia.

Therefore, the myth should be debunked regarding the statement of the Russian government and the Russian elite that the Russian right-wing radicalism has been exclusively Russian. In this case, it is more decent to appeal to the claim made by Putin and some Western representatives of the far right that Russia is the West – but the West that they believe has been lost due to the overwhelming influence of the liberal and leftist values.

Putin's ideology (2012 – 2024) has been a distorted, Russianised model of political radicalism based on a combination of authoritarianism, patriotism, anti-Western sentiment, conservatism, state capitalism and military force. This ideology has allowed Vladimir Putin and his entourage to ensure control over the country and pursue an aggressive foreign policy, posing a serious threat to the integrity of the international relations system. A striking example is the Russo-Ukrainian War, which broke out in 2014 and continues to this day. This war has posed a serious threat to the collapse of the European project and the emergence of the Kremlin's Eurasian anti-liberal project in its place.

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