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**THE OTTOMAN-TURKISH VECTOR OF HETMAN IVAN VYHOVSKYI'S
DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND THE VICTORY
IN THE MUSCOVITE–UKRAINIAN WAR OF 1657 – 1659**

Abstract. *The purpose of this study is to analyze the historical development of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian Cossack state, particularly during the rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy, which took place under conditions of internal political strife and Moscow's aggression against Ukraine, especially in the context of fomenting civil war. Under these circumstances, the hetman not only established diplomatic relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but also initiated the Black Sea vector of foreign relations to strengthen international support in resisting the aforementioned aggression. The study of Ukrainian and Turkish written sources and historiography, along with the objective interpretation of the information obtained regarding the stated issues, enables a thorough reconstruction of the course of Hetman Vyhovskiy's foreign policy activities and the joint military campaign. In this context, particular attention is paid to the Ukrainian embassy to Bakhchysarai and the presence of a large diplomatic mission from the hetman to Ottoman Türkiye, which held strategic significance for the development of relations between these countries and reflected their mutual interest in deepening such ties. The circumstances resulting from Muscovite aggression brought to the fore the issue of implementing the terms of the agreements, especially the organization of a military campaign against the enemy. The research methodology is based on adherence to the principles of historicism and historical source studies, ensuring scholarly objectivity and concrete-historical systematization, as well as the principles of interdisciplinarity and the establishment of the reliability and informational value of the identified facts and data. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the civilizational interpretation of the historiosophy of relations between Cossack-Hetman Ukraine, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Sublime Porte, aimed at the defense of Ukrainian lands in the context of state-building. It also lies in the application of the author's methodology for interpreting relevant historical events based on the available information, including Ottoman-Turkish written sources and historiography. Conclusions.* In conclusion, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hetmanate Ukraine and the Sublime Porte during the rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy was a prolonged but ultimately successful process. It is worth noting that Hetman Vyhovskiy, an alumnus of the Kyiv-

Mohyla Collegium (now the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy), was a seasoned statesman who understood the necessity and strategic value of the “Turkish alternative” for the Cossack state, caught between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Muscovite Tsardom, and the Crimean Khanate. He participated in negotiations on Ukraine’s behalf as part of a large diplomatic mission of approximately one hundred individuals, led by the Cossack Yarema Petranovskiy—evidence of the Hetmanate’s active foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire.

As a result of the Hetman government’s successful diplomatic efforts, treaties were concluded between the Ukrainian Cossack state, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. Based on mutual agreement, a joint military campaign was launched to defend against Muscovite aggression, which proved extremely successful for the allies: the Muscovite army suffered a crushing defeat in the Konotop War; the fortress of Konotop was liberated, and another frontier fortress was retaken from Muscovite control. The strengthening of the Black Sea vector of Cossack diplomacy had strategic significance for the economic development of the Hetmanate. The preservation and continuation of this Black Sea orientation were evident in the foreign policy of Vyhovskiy’s successors and, in my view, remain a relevant historical factor today. It should also be emphasized that the preservation and development of a democratic system of governance, the status of the Ukrainian language as the official state language, and the principle that the administration of the state should be conducted by ethnic Ukrainians, were among the central priorities of Hetman Vyhovskiy’s domestic policy. In contrast, the foreign policy of the Muscovite Tsardom toward Ukraine was based on fomenting civil war within the Hetmanate and attempting to seize Ukrainian territory. It is evident to me that the Russian state continues to demonstrate the same approach toward Ukraine today, as evidenced by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014.

Key words: historical source, diplomacy, Hetman, Vyhovskiy, Bakhchysarai, Istanbul, treaty, Muscovite aggression, Konotop, Ukraine, victory, political language.

ОСМАНСЬКО-ТУРЕЦЬКИЙ ВЕКТОР ДИПЛОМАТИЧНОЇ ДІЯЛЬНОСТІ ГЕТЬМАНА ІВАНА ВИГОВСЬКОГО ТА ПЕРЕМОГА В МОСКОВСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКІЙ ВІЙНІ 1657 – 1659 рр.

Анотація. Мета дослідження – проаналізувати історичний розвиток зовнішньої політики Української козацької держави, зосібна під час управління гетьмана Івана Виговського, яке тривало в умовах внутрішньополітичних суперечок і московської агресії проти України, зокрема у розпалюванні громадянської війни. В цих умовах гетьман з налагодженням дипломатичних відносин з Річчю Посполитою, також організував Чорноморський вектор розвитку таких відносин з метою посилення міжнародної підтримки з метою протистояти зазначеній агресії. Вивчення українських і турецьких писемних джерел, та історіографії, а також об’єктивна інтерпретація отриманих відомостей стосовно порушених проблем уможливорює ретельно простежити перебіг зовнішньополітичної діяльності гетьмана І. Виговського та спільної воєнної кампанії. У цьому контекст іперодовсім привертає увагу українське посольство до Бахчисараю, перебування великої дипломатичної місії гетьмана в Османській Туреччині, яка мала стратегічне значення щодо розвитку відносин між цими країнами і демонструвала обопільне бажання поглиблювати такі взаємини. Обставина, що склалася у зв’язку з агресією з боку московитів актуалізувала проблему стосовно виконання умов домовленостей – організації воєнної кампанії проти ворога. **Методологія дослідження** базується на дотриманні принципів історизму та історичного джерелознавства, забезпечення наукової об’єктивності та конкретно-історичної системності, а також на принципах міждисциплінарності і принципі встановлення достовірності й інформаційної цінності виявлених відомостей і фактів. **Наукова новизна** дослідження полягає у цивілізаційному осмисленні історіософії розвитку взаємин між козацько-гетьманською Україною, Річчю Посполитою, Кримським ханством, Високою Портою з метою оборони українських земель в контексті розвитку державності та у застосуванні авторської методології інтерпретування відповідних історичних подій з врахуванням наявних відомостей, зокрема з османсько-турецьких писемних джерел та історіографії. **Висновки.** Налагодження дипломатичних відносин між гетьманською Україною та Високою Портою в часи правління гетьмана Івана Виговського було тривалим, але успішним процесом. Наголошу,

що гетьман Іван Виговський здобув освіту у Києво-Могилянській колегії, був досвідченим політиком, який розумів необхідність і корисність “турської альтернативи” для козацької держави, затиснутої між Річчю Посполитою, Московським царством і Кримським ханством. Він брав участь у перемовинах з українського боку в складі численної делегації із майже 100 осіб, яку очолював козак Єремій Петрановський, що свідчить про активність зовнішньої політики гетьманського уряду у стосунках із Високою Портою. Унаслідок вдалої дипломатичної діяльності уряду гетьмана Івана Виговського були укладені договори між Українською козацькою державою, Кримським ханством, Османською державою. На основі взаємної домовленості було організовано воєнну кампанію з метою захисту від агресії Московського царства, яка виявилася дуже успішною для союзників: московське військо зазнало повної поразки у Конотопській війні, було звільнено фортецю Конотоп і відвоєвано ще одну фортецю, розташовану була на порубіжжі з Московським царством. Посилення чорноморського вектора діяльності козацької дипломатії мало стратегічне значення для розвитку економіки гетьманської України. Збереження активності чорноморського вектора в зовнішній політиці гетьманської України помітно відчувалося у дипломатичній діяльності наступних українських гетьманів та, на мою думку, є важливим історичним фактором у теперішній час. Варто наголосити, що збереження та розвиток демократичного державного устрою, української мови як офіційної державної мови, а також, зокрема, встановлення вимоги, щоб управління державою здійснювалося власне українцями, стали пріоритетними чинниками у політиці гетьманського уряду Івана Виговського. Натомість зовнішня політика московського царату щодо України ґрунтувалась на розпалюванні громадянської війни у гетьманській державі та намаганні загарбати українські землі. Для мене очевидним є те, що такі підходи російська держава щодо України демонструє й сьогодні, про що свідчить російсько-українська війна, яка почалася у 2014 р.

Ключові слова: історичне джерело, дипломатія, гетьман, Виговський, Бахчисарай, Стамбул, домовленість, московська агресія, Конотоп, Україна, перемога, політична мова.

Problem Statement. The significance of studying this topic lies in the fact that the exploration of the historical development of the foreign policy of the Ukrainian Cossack state during the Muscovite aggression under Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy's leadership – particularly his multi-vector diplomatic relations with an emphasis on the Black Sea direction (with the Crimean Khanate and especially the Ottoman Empire) aimed at countering this aggression – requires deep scholarly analysis. This analysis must take into account information from the aforementioned written sources and historiographical materials.

Review of Sources and Recent Studies. The problem of the historical development of the diplomatic activity of the Hetman governments of the Ukrainian Cossack state – particularly as reflected in Ottoman-Turkish sources and historiographical materials – has been studied by both Ukrainian and foreign scholars, including Yurii Mytsyk (Mytsyk, 2004; Mytsyk, 2010), Yücel Öztürk (Öztürk, 2015), Ferhad Turanly (Turanly, 2017; Turanly, 2018; Turanli, 2018; Turanly, 2020; Turanly, 2023), Hande Gündüz (Gündüz, 2024), and others.

Purpose of the Research. The aim of this publication is to present the results of the analysis of the information available from Ottoman-Turkish written sources and historiography regarding the historical development of international relations of Cossack-Hetmanate Ukraine during the rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy. Particular focus is on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the governments of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire in the context of resisting the territorial encroachments of the Tsardom of Moscow on Ukrainian lands.

Research Results. In addressing this issue, it is important to note that during our study of Ottoman-Turkish written monuments from the second half of the 17th century, chief focus was on the manuscript by the renowned Ukrainian historian Mykola Petrovskiy, entitled *From the Data on the History of the Ukrainian-Turkish Relations in the Second Half of*

the 17th Century, dated 2 December 1931 (Petrovskiy, 1934; Turanly, 2023, p. 145)¹. This research is based on Old Turkish written documents concerning the diplomatic activities of Ukrainian hetmans, including Ivan Vyhovskiy (r. 1657–1659).

This Ukrainian hetman, a talented diplomat of the period of the national revolution of 1648 – 1676, studied at the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium. In the Battle of Zhovti Vody in 1648, he was captured by the Tatars but was ransomed by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi (Mytsyk, 2004, p. 83; Tayrova-Yakovleva, 2011, pp. 128–183) and later became his close associate. At the meeting of the Council of Officers held in Chyhyryn on August 23–26, 1657, Ivan Vyhovskiy agreed to assume the office of hetman. On October 25, 1657, a General Council was held in Korsun with the participation of officers, rank-and-file Cossacks, and clergy.

This council, which was attended by diplomatic representatives from Sweden, Poland, Austria, Turkey, Crimea, Transylvania, Moldova, and Wallachia, confirmed the election of Ivan Vyhovskiy as hetman. This event was significant for strengthening Ukraine's international position, particularly in terms of renewing alliances with the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. At the same council, an alliance agreement with Sweden was formalized (Butych, Rynsevych, Teslenko, 2004, p. 24).

Amidst the threat of an attack from Muscovy, Ivan Vyhovskiy concluded the *Hadiach Agreement* with the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth on 6 September 1658. The agreement, titled *The Hadiach Treaty between the Zaporizhian Host and the Envoys of the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth Concerning the Rights of Ukraine, which was to Join Poland under the Name of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia*, sought to formalize a new political configuration (Butych, Rynsevych, Teslenko, 2004, pp. 46–51). In his study *Rus-Ukraine and Moscovia-Russia*, L. Tsegelskyi notes: “Having considered all of this, Vyhovskiy and Nemyrich² realized the direction of Muscovite policy and decided to break away from Moscow. Poland, in turn, sought to regain the Cossacks' loyalty, and Polish envoy Benyovsky arrived to negotiate with the Cossacks. As a result, at a great council in Hadiach (1658), the Cossacks resolved to withdraw from Moscow and made the following agreement with Poland:

1. Ukraine joins the union with Lithuania and Poland as a separate third member – the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia (Ukrainian) – with Kyiv as its capital;
2. Ukraine (Grand Duchy of Ruthenia) shall enjoy full autonomy and be a distinct state;
3. Ukrainians shall elect their own hetman;
4. Supreme authority in Ukraine shall belong to a parliament elected by the people;
5. The official language shall be Ruthenian (Ukrainian), and only Ruthenians-Ukrainians shall hold office in Ukraine” (Tsegelskyi, 1916, pp. 55–56). In particular, Article 7 of the treaty guaranteed Ukrainians the right to establish their own academy, registers, chanceries, and printing houses with Ukrainian teachers. It also permitted the founding of a second academy modeled after the one in Kyiv (Butych, Rynsevych, & Teslenko, 2004, pp. 46–47).

Nonetheless, the Hadiach Agreement also included provisions that significantly limited the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Cossack state, particularly in the realm of international relations. However, there were exceptions concerning the Cossacks' participation in military conflicts between Moscow and Poland. For example, Article 14 stated: “If the Muscovite Tsar

¹ This document is preserved at the Institute of Manuscripts of the V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine (F. Kh. No. 14634. *Ukraine and the East (Collection of Articles)*. Vol. I. Stamp bearing the inscription and date: “Publishing House of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 15 January 1934”).

² Yurii Nemyrych – an advisor to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy – was among those who “wished to make Rus'-Ukraine free, strong, wealthy, and enlightened” (Tsegelskyi, 1916, p. 54).

were to engage in war with Poland, the Cossacks may remain neutral; but if the Muscovites were to attack Ukraine, the Poles must defend it” (Butych, Rynsevych, & Teslenko, 2004, p. 47). Article 16 of the Hadiach Treaty was particularly important for the foreign policy of Hetmanate Ukraine, as it prohibited the Ukrainian hetman from recognizing the authority of the Muscovite tsar, while permitting him to establish relations with the Crimean Khanate (Butych, Rynsevych, & Teslenko, 2004, p. 47). Since the Crimean Khanate was under Ottoman suzerainty, these relations effectively drew Ukraine into the sphere of the Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy. It is noteworthy that even before the signing of the Hadiach Treaty, a Cossack delegation of three representatives was sent to the Crimean Khanate in April 1658. Three more representatives from the Tatar side joined the mission, and together they travelled to Istanbul for negotiations. As a result, an Ottoman diplomatic mission was dispatched to the Ukrainian hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi. These events confirm the existence of military and political relations between the Hetmanate and the Crimean governments during Vyhovskyi’s rule. Consequently, from May to July 1658, joint military campaigns were launched against the Tsardom of Moscow, culminating in the victory of the Ukrainian-Cossack – Crimean-Tatar army.

Ukrainian historian Ivan Butych emphasized in his book *Universals of Ukrainian Hetmans...*: “Even before the negotiations in Hadiach had concluded, military actions with Moscow had begun, culminating in the Battle of Konotop on 28 June 1659, where the Cossack army, reinforced by the [Crimean] Tatar horde [army] and a small Polish [military] detachment, defeated the numerically superior military forces of the [Muscovite] enemy” (Butych, Rynsevych, & Teslenko, 2004, p. 12; Stepankov, 2003, pp. 502–503).

Analyzing the foreign policy of the Ukrainian Cossack State, historian Mykola Petrovskyi noted that “in the second half of the 17th century, namely during the 1648 revolution and afterwards, when studying the [pages of] Ukrainian history, we frequently encounter information that attests not only to Ukraine’s economic relations with Turkey, but also to political and diplomatic ties between the governments of these countries. Moreover, we are even aware of certain facts from Ukrainian history of the latter half of the 17th century indicating that relations between the governments of Ukraine and Turkey became closer” (Petrovskyi, 1934; Kirzhaev, & Ulyanovskyi, 1993, pp. 76–89).

Regarding this issue, Ukrainian historian and Orientalist Yaroslav Dashkevych, in his study of Ukrainian-Turkish relations, stated that the Cossack policy’s direction was set by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. This direction implied reliance of Ukraine on the Black Sea and on the state that controlled it – Türkiye. Later Cossack hetmans who concluded vassal treaties with the Ottoman Empire were simply following in the footsteps of the great hetman (Dashkevych, 2004, p. 64; Dashkevych, 2006, p. 207).

Further developing this idea, the scholar identified four factors that justified the benefit for Ukrainian hetmans in accepting Turkish protection:

- autonomous status (examples included Moldavia, Wallachia, Transylvania, and, finally, the Crimean Khanate);
- relative religious tolerance within the Ottoman Empire, especially beyond the core Turkish territories;
- a simple, comprehensible, and relatively light tax system (the annual *haraj*);
- a strong guarantee against Crimean Tatar raids into Ukraine (Dashkevych, 2004, p. 64).

Concerning this matter, historian Volodymyr Maslak stated: “A key element in the hetmans’ political calculations was the idea of Turkish protection as an alternative to the

overlordship of the Muscovite Tsar and the Polish King – an idea aimed at counterbalancing their evident desire to dissolve the Hetmanate within their respective political bodies” (Maslak, 2014, pp. 130–136).

Speaking of the reasons for the activation of the Black Sea vector in the diplomatic efforts of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, historian Yaroslav Dashkevych noted: “At different stages of their political careers, several Ukrainian hetmans recognized or attempted to obtain Turkish protection. Ivan Vyhovskyi was one of those who broke ties with Moscow and defeated its army near Konotop (1659); in that battle, [Crimean] Tatar units took part on the Ukrainian side by order of the Turkish sultan, and after the failure of the Hadiach Agreement with Poland, Vyhovskyi began considering transition under the rule of the [Ottoman] Sultan [Mehmed IV]” (Dashkevych, 2004, p. 64).

Thus, the aforementioned political, religious, and economic factors facilitated the strengthening of the Black Sea vector in the foreign policy of Ukrainian hetmans, aiming to secure support from the Sublime Porte to reinforce the position of the Ukrainian Cossack State in its struggle against enemies.

To confirm the existence of relations between the Ukrainian Cossack State and the Ottoman Empire, historian Mykola Petrovskyi referred to the following documents:

- a copy of a letter from the Turkish Grand Vizier [Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1578–1661, Grand Vizier since 1656)] to Ivan Vyhovskyi;
- a record of the interrogation in Moscow, at the Ambassadorial Prikaz, of the Turkish *chaush*³ Hasan, who had been sent by Yurii Khmelnytsky as a prisoner;
- a record of the testimony of Yeremiia Petranovskyi in the Ambassadorial Prikaz in Moscow, who had participated in negotiations between Ivan Vyhovskyi’s government and the Ottoman government and later returned to Moscow (Petrovskyi, 1934, pp. 1–2).

The letter from the Turkish vizier to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, translated from Ottoman Turkish into Old Ukrainian, was dated “...in the current 168th year, on the 29th day of April”⁴ and was delivered to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi by the Cossack Yeremiia Petranovskyi. The original text reads:

“To the elected nobleman in the law of Jesus, ruler⁵ of great cities, the lawful partial lord of the *bazaryans*⁶, who holds power in his region – the Cossack Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi – this is a friendly word.

Let your humble letter, addressed to our friend, reach the most pious, most exalted, most honorable, mighty Muslim ruler [Sultan Mehmed IV], His Majesty, and his high threshold. We ordered the letter to be translated and informed our Great Lord [Sultan Mehmed IV]; thus, our Great Lord learned that your enemy, Moscow, came to you and caused harm there⁷; and that you [Ivan Vyhovskyi], clinging to the honorable robe of our pious and noble Lord [Sultan Mehmed IV], His Majesty, should remain steadfastly and firmly in humility⁸. And so: to be a friend to your friend, and an enemy to your enemy. We shall learn all of your [Ivan

³ This refers to the title of an official in the government of the Ottoman Empire who served as a referent on matters of international policy and diplomatic missions.

⁴ The indicated date follows the calendar system that calculated time from the year 5508 BCE as the date of the “Creation of the World.” This system was used until the year 7208, which corresponds to 1700 CE (7208 – 5508 = 1700). Therefore, in the cited text, the date “in the 168th year, on the 29th day of April” should be understood as 29 April 1660 in the Christian calendar (1492 + 168 = 1660) (Turanyl, 2020, p. 291, note 855).

⁵ This refers to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi.

⁶ This refers to the Nazarenes, the inhabitants of the city of Nazareth.

⁷ This refers to the incursions by the Muscovite army into Ukrainian territories.

⁸ This refers to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi’s recognition of the suzerainty of the Sublime Porte.

Vyhovskiy's] wishes, and they shall be fulfilled. The pious and blessed Crimean Tsar [Khan Mehmed Giray IV (reign: 1654 – 1666, second reign)] will be notified to provide assistance to you [Ivan Vyhovskiy]. You must be encouraged to act bravely and remain steadfast in humility. And this friend of yours [Sultan Mehmed IV] shall be concerned with all your [Ivan Vyhovskiy's] affairs, and your wishes shall be fulfilled; and if God wills, your enemies shall suffer revenge, and thereafter there shall be greetings” (Petrovskiy, 1934, p. 5).

From the content of the document, it is evident that it was a response to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy's appeal to Sultan Mehmed IV requesting Ottoman protection. The letter was written by the Grand Vizier on behalf of the sultan. In other words, the ruler of the Ottoman Empire himself decided to accept Hetman Vyhovskiy under his protection. Accordingly, an order was issued to Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray IV to provide the necessary assistance to the hetman in his struggle against the enemies of Ukraine. The sultan also issued a caution regarding the necessity of remaining faithful to the agreement implied by the contents of the letter. Furthermore, the letter expresses the sultan's confidence that the mutual enemies of both countries would ultimately be punished.

Another piece of evidence confirming the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Ukrainian and Ottoman governments during Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy's rule is the manuscript document “Interrogation Record in Moscow's Ambassadorial Prikaz of the Turkish *chaush* Asan, sent by [Yurii] Khmelnytsky as a prisoner” (Petrovskiy, 1934, p. 5). The record, in particular, states:

“On the 29th day⁹ of the month of April, in the Ambassadorial Prikaz, the Turk sent by Hetman Yurii Khmelnytsky, during interrogation, reported the following: he is called Asankom, and he is a *chaush*... and he was appointed *chaush* in Tsarhorod [Istanbul] about five years ago. Allegedly, [Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskiy sent envoys to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV]¹⁰, and there were about 100 men with them. The envoys supposedly visited the sultan in Tsarhorod. And the sultan reportedly sent his own envoy to Vyhovskiy along with Vyhovskiy's envoys; and allegedly Vyhovskiy, in turn, sent his own envoy to Adrianople¹¹ – [Yeremia] Petranovskiy – to the Turkish sultan six weeks before the feast of St. Demetrius¹². Petranovskiy resided in Adrianople for about three months; he reportedly did not meet with the sultan but was received by the vizier” (Turanlı, 2020, pp. 293–294).

In my view, this document is of particular importance, as the interrogation record of the *çavuş* reveals the circumstances of the Hetmanate government's diplomatic mission, led by Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy, to the key Ottoman cities of Istanbul and Edirne (Türkiye). Specifically, it clarifies the dates and duration of the large delegation's stay under the leadership of Yeremia Petranovskiy. The information contained in this document confirms the successful nature of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission, which resulted in the establishment of diplomatic

⁹ For this date, see: note 5.

¹⁰ It is evidently a reference to the Cossack Yeremia Petranovskiy, who headed a delegation of 100 men – a clear indication of the importance of this diplomatic mission

¹¹ Concerning this city (Turk. *Edirne*), located in the western part of modern-day Turkey, it is worth noting that it was one of the most strategically significant cities in the Ottoman Empire. In 1365, during the reign of Sultan Murad I Hudavendigar (1360 – 1389), the sultanic palace (Eski Saray / Old Palace, Yeni Saray / New Palace) was constructed in Edirne, fortified with strong defensive structures. After the fall of Constantinople – the capital of the Byzantine Empire – in 1453, the city was renamed Istanbul. Although the newly designated capital housed the Topkapi Palace, the Ottoman sultans (notably Mehmed IV) continued to rule – among other places – from the palace in Edirne (Sertoğlu, 1986, p. 94).

¹² Approximately September 28–29, 1660. The autumn tradition of commemorating the deceased is associated with the feast day of the Great Martyr Demetrius of Thessaloniki (who died on 8 November 306 for his Christian faith). This day typically falls on the Saturday preceding the seasonal change of autumn.

relations between the Hetmanate and the Ottoman government, with corresponding political and legal consequences for both sides.

Continuing the discussion of this issue, it is important to highlight that valuable information concerning the establishment and development of Ukrainian-Turkish interstate relations during the rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy is found in the recorded testimonies of Yeremia Petranovskiy, who was personally involved in the Hetmanate government's negotiations with the Ottoman-Turkish authorities. According to the text, "...[Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskiy instructed [Yeremia Petranovskiy] on how to maintain relations with the Crimean Khan [Mehmed Giray IV], and they allied themselves with each other, agreeing to remain united in friendship and not to betray one another during wartime¹³. It is said that [Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskiy, having allied with the Crimean Tatars, came to Konotop¹⁴, although [Yeremia Petranovskiy] was not with him at that time. And allegedly, following that, [Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskiy sent his envoys Herman and Stomatenko [Ostamotenko Ostafii] to the Turkish sultan [Mehmed IV], declaring that he had established an alliance with the Crimean Khan and was now engaged in close consultations with him¹⁵. And the sultan was informed of all this, which is why he accepted Vyhovskiy under his protection along with his army and ordered his forces to defend him should any side attack during wartime. Vyhovskiy, in turn, pledged to act likewise, offering military assistance. And allegedly, the sultan, as a sign of his acceptance, sent his envoys to [Ivan Vyhovskiy], and in the presence of these envoys¹⁶, Vyhovskiy pledged allegiance to the sultan¹⁷. Reportedly, [hetman Ivan] Vyhovskiy did indeed take an oath of allegiance in the presence of the envoys and received from them, on behalf of the sultan, a *kaftan* and a *turban* as symbols of recognition¹⁸..." (Turanly, 2023, pp. 56–57; Petrovskiy, 1934, pp. 7–11).

Thus, this information confirms Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy's final acceptance of Ottoman protection, along with the corresponding conditions, which included the defense of Ukraine against Muscovite aggression. It is also worth emphasizing that the significance of the Ukrainian diplomatic mission to the central cities of Ottoman Turkey is beyond doubt. From the reviewed document, we learn the number of individuals involved in the delegation and the role of the Cossack Yeremia Petranovskiy as the head of the mission to the Sublime Porte. The most crucial information is the report on the successful outcome of the negotiations and the sultan's decision to place the Ukrainian hetman under his protection. This conclusion is further supported by the reciprocal diplomatic mission from the Ottoman ruler to the Ukrainian hetman, during which symbolic items confirming the establishment of the protectorate were presented.

It should be emphasized that even before dispatching his envoy Yeremia Petranovskiy to Sultan Mehmed IV, Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy had reached an agreement with Crimean

¹³ This refers to the establishment of diplomatic and allied relations between Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy and Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray IV, which preceded the agreement with the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁴ That is, the reference is to the Battle of Konotop, which took place in the summer of 1659 and was a joint military operation of Vyhovskiy and Mehmed Giray IV against Muscovite forces.

¹⁵ This indicates the strategic partnership between Vyhovskiy and the Crimean khan, which was crucial for forming an anti-Muscovite coalition.

¹⁶ The text describes the dispatch of Ottoman-Turkish envoys to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy as confirmation of the agreements achieved during negotiations led by Yeremia Petranovskiy.

¹⁷ This refers to the formal acceptance of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiy under the protectorate of Ottoman-Turkish Sultan Mehmed IV, accompanied by mutual military obligations.

¹⁸ Vyhovskiy's recognition of Ottoman-Turkish suzerainty should be understood as entering into vassal dependence, which, according to Ottoman tradition, involved the Sultan's military support in exchange for loyalty from the vassal.

Khan Mehmed Giray IV on the intention to establish direct diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte, in accordance with legal norms of international diplomacy. This method of conducting foreign affairs by the Hetmanate government demonstrates Vyhovskyi's abilities as an experienced diplomat. The text continues: "...together with the same envoys from the Turkish sultan, [Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskyi sent [Yeremia] Petranovskyi as a courier to inform the sultan that he himself, Vyhovskyi, would soon come in person as a strong reinforcement and would also send his envoys to discuss the terms of allegiance to the sultan [Mehmed IV]. And reportedly, [Yeremia] Petranovskyi arrived to the sultan in Adrianople in the month of September [1660]. The letter from [Hetman Ivan] Vyhovskyi was accepted by the vizier..."¹⁹ (Turanyl, 2023, pp. 56–57; Petrovskyi, 1934, pp. 7–11).

This text demonstrates the prolonged process of negotiations over the formalization of diplomatic relations between the respective governments. Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi once again sent Yeremia Petranovskyi to the city of Adrianople with a letter addressed to Sultan Mehmed IV, stating that the Ukrainian hetman intended to personally take part in further negotiations to define the conditions for concluding an agreement between the Cossack-Hetmanate Ukraine and the Ottoman-Turkish Empire.

It is worth noting that, at that time, a certain conflict arose due to information received from the envoys of the Crimean Khan who had arrived at the sultan's court. Historian Mykola Petrovskyi wrote that the Crimean envoys, in the presence of Yeremia Petranovskyi, reported that the Zaporozhian Cossacks were under the authority of the Muscovite Tsar and, on his instructions, had elected Yurii Khmelnytskyi as hetman (Petrovskyi, 1934, pp. 7–11). Ivan Krypiakevych, assessing the political activity of Yurii Khmelnytskyi (Krypiakevich, 1990, pp. 346, 351; Joukovsky, 1994, pp. 44–45)²⁰, wrote that "as soon as the Muscovite authorities got their hands on the hetman [Yurii Khmelnytskyi]... they implemented their plans without hesitation" and imprisoned the hetman. The treaty signed in Pereiaslav on 27 October 1659 marked a return to Muscovite suzerainty and had catastrophic consequences for Ukraine (Krypiakevich, 1990, pp. 194–195; Borysenko, 1999, pp. 3–18).

According to the testimony of the Cossack Yeremii Petranovskyi, Sultan Mehmed IV of the Ottoman Empire informed Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich of Muscovy of his demand to return the cities previously seized from the Ottoman domain. The sultan warned that failure to comply would compel him to declare war. The Muscovite tsar refused to concede to this ultimatum. Furthermore, it was reported that the sultan intended to send a letter to Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi, promising military assistance. A similar message was also sent to the Crimean Khan, Mehmed Giray IV (Turanyl, 2023, pp. 57–58; Petrovskyi, 1934, pp. 8–11; Serhiychuk, 2001, pp. 214–226).

At the time, Hetman Vyhovskyi, operating in Right-Bank Ukraine, mobilized the Ukrainian army, which, together with hired foreign mercenaries, numbered approximately 60,000 troops. He was reinforced by the Crimean Tatar force of 40,000 under the command of the khan. Regarding the onset of hostilities, a historian Oleksii Sokyрко notes that in late March 1659, Muscovite forces under Prince Trubetskoy crossed the Ukrainian border near Putyvl and launched an offensive toward the southwest (Sokyрко, 2008, pp. 14–17).

As the war escalated, Muscovy initiated full-scale military operations against Ukraine.

¹⁹ In Ottoman-Turkish diplomatic practice, the granting of a **kaftan** (a luxurious silk or velvet robe) and a **türban** symbolized formal recognition and legitimization of the new vassal's authority.

²⁰ Yurii Khmelnytskyi (1641 – 1685) was the younger son of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. He was elected hetman with Muscovite support and later became a puppet of both the Muscovite and Ottoman-Turkish governments at different stages of his rule.

In accordance with the terms of the military political alliance, Hetman Vyhovskiyi appealed to Sultan Mehmed IV for support. Subsequently, on June 28–29 (July 8–9, New Style), 1659, fierce battles occurred near the town of Konotop, on the Sosnivka River. During these clashes, an estimated 30,000 Muscovite soldiers were killed, and approximately 5,000 were taken prisoner (Battle of Konotop 2024, pp. 3–4).

In evaluating the consequences of the war, a historian Viktor Horobets corroborates the scale of Muscovite casualties, reporting the capture of some 15,000 soldiers and 50 voivodes. The Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar forces sustained losses of around 10,000 troops (Horobets, 2009, pp. 34–36). Thus, the Konotop campaign culminated in a decisive victory for the allied forces and a devastating defeat for the Muscovite army (Turanly, 2017, pp. 46–47; Turanly, 2020, pp. 287–299).

Despite this remarkable triumph, Hetman Vyhovskiyi was unable to consolidate the military success due to internal opposition. Strong resistance from segments of the Ukrainian Cossack elite, who were dissatisfied with the terms of the Treaty of Hadiach, ultimately forced him to resign. In September 1659, Vyhovskiyi stepped down in favour of Yurii Khmelnytskyi, who subsequently served as hetman in two non-consecutive terms (1659 – 1663, 1677 – 1681).

In our view, it is necessary to take into account the research of Turkish scholars, particularly that of the prominent historiographer and source critic İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı (Turanly, 2020, pp. 66–67). He wrote that the Muscovite tsar²¹, in preparing for a campaign against the Crimean Khanate, reached agreements with the Zaporozhzhian Cossacks under his control, as well as with the Cossacks of “Ozyu”²², who were subordinated to Poland and the Crimean Khanate, and the so-called “Özi Kazakları”²³. The tsar then sent an envoy with a letter to the Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, proposing an alliance. According to the Turkish historian, the Cossack hetman rejected this proposal and informed the Crimean khan accordingly. In response, Khan Mehmed Giray IV, preempting the Muscovite campaign, launched a military operation against Muscovy in the month of Ramadan in the year 1069 Hijri²⁴ (Uzunçarşılı 1995, vol. III, part 2, 5th ed., pp. 159–160).

Because the Zaporozhzhian Cossacks refused to ally themselves with Muscovy, the tsar, commanding a force of 17,000, laid siege to the Cossack fortress of Konotop. Simultaneously, he sent Cossack units loyal to him to the fortress of Azov in order to divide and weaken the Crimean Tatar forces. At that moment, Hetman Ivan Vyhovskiyi sent a letter to the Crimean khan stating that, should the fortress of Konotop fall to the Muscovites, all Cossacks would be forced to submit to the tsar. In response, the khan dispatched his troops toward Konotop. As a result of the ensuing campaign, the fortress was successfully liberated. Captured Muscovite soldiers testified that the tsar had been preparing this invasion for three years.

Following the relief of Konotop, another 60,000 Cossack troops joined the Crimean Tatar army. Under the command of Mehmed Giray IV, a united force of 100,000 troops launched an offensive to punish the Muscovite army of 50,000, which was ultimately destroyed in a fierce battle. Thousands of Muscovite soldiers, including one commander-in-chief and four senior generals, were captured. After this victory, the allied forces pursued a continued

²¹ The aforementioned author refers to the “Russian tsar,” which is inaccurate in terms of the historical designation of the state; the correct term should be “Muscovite tsar”.

²² The passage refers to the Zaporozhian Cossacks (Turk. *Özi, Özi Kazakları*). For a detailed discussion of the semantic meaning of this term in Ottoman-Turkish written sources, see the *Terminological Dictionary* (Turanly 2020, 529).

²³ The Dnieper Cossacks of Ukraine.

²⁴ According to the Turkish author, the events described took place in 1659; however, the actual date is May 1658.

offensive with the objective of delivering a decisive blow and compelling the Muscovite army to surrender. Eventually, all enemy forces stationed at a frontier fortress were annihilated and drowned in the river. After capturing the fortress, the joint Ukrainian-Cossack–Crimean Tatar army returned home.

According to Ottoman-Turkish historical sources, approximately 100,000 Muscovite soldiers perished in this war – including Cossacks loyal to the tsar – and 50,000 were taken prisoner (Uzunçarşılı 1995, vol. III, part 2, 5th ed., 159). Following its defeat in the Battle of Konotop, the Muscovite state refrained from undertaking any military operations for a long period, particularly with regard to gaining access to the Sea of Azov. At the same time, in accordance with prior agreements, Muscovy maintained peaceful relations with the Sublime Porte and periodically dispatched envoys bearing gifts to Istanbul (Uzunçarşılı, 1995, vol. III, part 2, 5th ed., p. 160). These accounts by the Turkish historian, derived from various sources and historiography, confirm the severity of the Muscovite defeat in the Konotop War.

Conclusions. In conclusion, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hetmanate Ukraine and the Sublime Porte during the rule of Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi was a prolonged but ultimately successful process. It is worth noting that Hetman Vyhovskyi, an alumnus of the Kyiv-Mohyla Collegium (now the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy), was a seasoned statesman who understood the necessity and strategic value of the “Turkish alternative” for the Cossack state, caught between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Muscovite Tsardom, and the Crimean Khanate. He participated in negotiations on Ukraine’s behalf as part of a large diplomatic mission of approximately one hundred individuals, led by the Cossack Yarema Petranovskyi – nevidence of the Hetmanate’s active foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire.

As a result of the Hetman government’s successful diplomatic efforts, treaties were concluded between the Ukrainian Cossack state, the Crimean Khanate, and the Ottoman Empire. Based on mutual agreement, a joint military campaign was launched to defend against Muscovite aggression, which proved extremely successful for the allies: the Muscovite army suffered a crushing defeat in the Konotop War, the fortress of Konotop was liberated, and another frontier fortress was retaken from Muscovite control.

The strengthening of the Black Sea vector of Cossack diplomacy had strategic significance for the economic development of the Hetmanate. The preservation and continuation of this Black Sea orientation were evident in the foreign policy of Vyhovskyi’s successors and, in my view, remain a relevant historical factor today.

It should also be emphasized that the preservation and development of a democratic system of governance, the status of the Ukrainian language as the official state language, and the principle that the administration of the state should be conducted by ethnic Ukrainians, were among the central priorities of Hetman Vyhovskyi’s domestic policy.

In contrast, the foreign policy of the Muscovite Tsardom toward Ukraine was based on fomenting civil war within the Hetmanate and attempting to seize Ukrainian territory. It is evident to me that the Russian state continues to demonstrate the same approach toward Ukraine today, as evidenced by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014.

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