Kharkiv offensive operation (may 12-17, 1942): miscalculationsin the operational command

Abstract

The purpose of the research – to do study on the organization of preparation for an offensive operation and the subsequent influence on the conduct of an offensive operation under difficult conditions of the following components: the interaction organization of large formations during the offensive, the use of troops and large mobile formations in a frontal offensive operation, the material support of troops under the conditions of an offensive with bridgeheads. The research methodology is based on the principles of historical knowledge (scientism, historicism, objectivity, systemic analysis), as well as on the use of a set of methods: dialectical, analytical, historical, biographical, comparative. The scientific novelty of the obtained results consists in the comprehensive analysis of the process of preparing and conducting an offensive front operation with the use of four tank corps, which is due to the absence in the domestic historiography of special historical generalizing works on the specified subject within the specified chronological limits. An objective assessment of the offensive operation significance of the South-Western Front has been given, as an example of unsuccessful actions for the development of military art in the operations of the German-Soviet war and its negative impact on the course of further military events in 1942. The Conclusions. The main reason for the tragedy is that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (actually Joseph Stalin) agreed to conduct an offensive operation at the insistence of the Military Council of the South-Western direction (SWD). A characteristic feature of management was the combination of functions: the Commander-in-Chief and his chief of staff of the South-Western direction were simultaneously the commander and chief of staff of the South-Western Front, respectively. This is a vivid example of incompetent military leadership. This incompetence gave a negative result, the actions of the SWF were carried out in isolation from the Southern Front (SF), as during the preparation, and especially during the operation. The main shortcoming of the overall planning of the offensive of the troops on the SWD was the lack of a proper operational support of the SWF strike group from the south by the SF forces. This was influenced by significant shortcomings made during the preparation and implementation of the operation.